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This article examines the most prominent interwar economist at the University of
Chicago, Frank Knight, through the lens of a controversial 1932 lecture in which he
exhorted his audience to vote Communist. The fact that he did so poses a historical
problem: why did the premier American exponent of conservative economic principles
appear to advocate a vote for radical change? This article argues that the speech
is representative of Knight’s deliberately paradoxical approach, in which he refused
to praise markets without adding caveats about their substantial limitations, and
expressed support for freedom of discussion alongside his skepticism of the public’s
capacity to exercise the privilege. In parsing these tensions, the article revises the
conventional interpretation of Knight, illuminates the contested environment within
which postwar free-market economics emerged, and reexamines a restrained defense
of capitalism that has been largely forgotten in the subsequent years.
After dinner on the Wednesday evening prior to the 1932 election, Frank Knight
entered a lecture hall in the Social Science Research Building at the University of
Chicago. As he took the lectern he faced a room that was overheated, underlit, and
almost filled with impatient students, who had gathered under the auspices of the
university’s Communist Club and the National Student League. “He looked like
a very intelligent little rodent,” Edward Shils later recalled, “rather adorable to
look at but well capable of giving one a nip which would not soon be forgotten.”1
Knight did not take long to establish his tone. “I hope I am not talking to mental
infants . . . or mental invalids,” he said, “and if anyone thinks he has come to
" This essay would not have been possible without the generous assistance of archivists
at the Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago. It
benefited greatly from comments and suggestions shared at seminars with the Institute for
Applied Economics and the Study of Business Enterprise at Johns Hopkins, the Edmond
J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics, and the Intellectual History Discussion Group at
Harvard.
1 Edward A. Shils, “Some Academics, Mainly in Chicago,” American Scholar 50/2 (1981), 180.
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a vaudeville show, there is still time to leave and correct the mistake.” He then
fulfilled the promise of the lecture’s provocative title, “The Case for Communism,
from the Standpoint of an Ex-liberal,” and announced its central theme: “Those
who want a change and wish to vote intelligently should vote Communist.”2
This lecture poses a historical problem. Knight is widely remembered as the
“sage and oracle” of the University of Chicago Economics Department between
his arrival in the late 1920s and the Second World War, and as one of the most
prominent academic advocates of free markets during the Roosevelt years.3 He
manifested little patience for what he referred to as “all the insane or diabolical
revolutionary propaganda and most of the stupid criticisms of the ‘capitalist
system’ that menace our free institutions.”4 His lectures were credited, despite
their notoriously diffuse presentation, with transforming incoming socialists into
nascent libertarians, in an act of political alchemy often cited as the origin of the
Chicago School.5 George Stigler recalled Knight as his most influential professor
at Chicago, and Milton Friedman remembered him as a “revered teacher” and
a departmental “star”; both were considered by their peers to be among a
Knight affinity group that behaved, at times, like “Swiss guards.”6 The Austrian
economist Friedrich Hayek expressed the opinion of many of the most prominent
opponents of progressive economic policies in the Atlantic community when he
2 Frank Knight, “The Case for Communism: From the Standpoint of an Ex-liberal,” in
Warren J. Samuels, ed., Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology,
archival supplement 2 (Greenwich, CT, 1991), 57–8. The lecture was privately published
by Knight in 1933, along with two other speeches, in an edited volume: Frank Knight, The
Dilemma of Liberalism (Ann Arbor, MI, 1933).
3 Melvin W. Reder, “Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change,” Journal of Economic
Literature 20/1 (1982), 6. James Buchanan describes Knight’s dominant personality in the
department in “Frank H. Knight,” in Edward A. Shils, ed., Remembering the University
of Chicago: Teachers, Scientists, and Scholars (Chicago, 1991). On Knight as the progenitor
of Chicago economics see William Breit and Roger L. Ransom, The Academic Scribblers
(Chicago, 1982), 193–204; Sherryl Davis Kasper, The Revival of Laissez-Faire in American
Macroeconomic Theory: A Case Study of the Pioneers (Northampton, MA, 2002), chap. 2;
and Johan Van Overtveldt, The Chicago School: How the University of Chicago Assembled
the Thinkers Who Revolutionized Economics and Business (Chicago, 2007), chap. 2.
4 Frank Knight, “The Rôle of Principles in Economics and Politics,” American Economic
Review 41/1 (1951), 14.
5 James Buchanan, “Better than Plowing,” in idem, Economics from the Outside In: ‘Better
than Plowing’ and Beyond (College Station, TX, 2007), 5.
6 George Stigler, Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist (Chicago, 2003), 16; Milton Friedman
to the editor of Challenge, July 1964, box 1, folder 3, Milton Friedman Papers, Hoover
Institution Archives; Milton Friedman and Rose D. Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs
(Chicago, 1998), 35; Paul A. Samuelson, “Economics in a Golden Age: A Personal Memoir,”
in Gerald Holton, ed., The Twentieth-Century Sciences: Studies in the Biography of Ideas
(New York, 1972), 161.
the radical conservatism of frank h. knight 515
referred to Knight as “the man who among Americans has probably done most
to spread an understanding of the working of a free society.”7 Why, then, did
the premier American exponent of conservative economic principles appear to
advocate a vote for radical change in the midst of the Great Depression?
Frank Knight’s writings have never neatly aligned with his imputed role
as a dedicated advocate of free enterprise. Throughout his career, he refused
either to extol the virtues of markets without drawing attention to their manifest
limitations and sins, or to observe those limitations and sins without enumerating
the formidable difficulties inherent in any attempt to overcome them. He
articulated a complex social philosophy that affirmed the critical content of
radicalism without yielding to its positive demands. The fact that he has been
eulogized as one of his generation’s most emphatic champions of free markets
illuminates the essential discontinuity between the defense of market-centered
modes of social organization in the 1930s and the conservative economic rhetoric
that has become familiar in more recent years. Knight’s deep ambivalence about
the attributes of capitalist societies demonstrates the extent to which laissez-
faire was discredited during the Great Depression even among those who were
perceived to be its least compromising advocates. To be a conservative economist
at the height of Knight’s career was not to champion free markets, but rather to
disagree with the particular manipulations that the government at the time was
pursuing.
The nature of free-market advocacy transformed in the years following the
conclusion of the Second World War, in a break that remains inadequately
studied and poorly understood. Knight’s successors at the University of Chicago,
Milton Friedman and George Stigler, did not inherit his reservations about
capitalism’s cultural degradations and institutional volatility. As a result, their
social vision involved a less restrained application of market principles, and
a less equivocal interpretation of the market economy’s largesse. Despite its
broad cultural significance, the nature of this transition has only rarely been
observed or analyzed. This relative neglect is a result, in part, of the segregation
of the history of economic thought from the concomitant disciplines of political
and intellectual history. Such partitions do not conform to a world in which
economists have come to serve as both policy advisers and public philosophers. A
serious engagement with the development of the postwar conservative intellectual
world will require a more thorough understanding of the social scientists who
helped to fashion its rhetoric and to establish and validate its assumptions. The
study of these scholars leads invariably to the University of Chicago in the 1930s,
where opponents of the New Deal found succor and an extraordinary proportion
7 Friedrich Hayek to Dr F. A. Harper of the William Volker Fund, 22 May 1961, box 58, folder
19, Friedrich Hayek Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.
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of the leading postwar economists received their doctoral degrees. Frank Knight
was at the center of this intellectual universe, and a renewed consideration of his
work leads to some surprising conclusions. By conflating teachers with their
students, and followers with their sources of inspiration, we have forgotten
the degree to which the conservative economists of the 1930s disagreed with
the policies their successors advocated in the supposed pursuit of a shared
ideal.
i
Frank Knight presented a highly unusual figure to the students who attended
his lecture on “The Case for Communism” in the autumn of 1932. Few university
professors, then or now, could transition with equal facility among digressions
into barnyard humor, German philosophy, and contemporary economic theory.
His very persona seemed to enact the relentless multiplicity that characterized his
philosophical imagination. The disparities in his self-presentation were produced,
in part, by the volatile interaction between his rural education and his relentlessly
inquiring mind. Knight was raised as the oldest of eleven children, nine of whom
survived, on a family farm in McLean County, Illinois. He attended two tiny and
faltering colleges in eastern Tennessee before making his way to the University
of Tennessee in Knoxville in 1911 and two years later, at the age of twenty-
seven, to graduate studies in the Department of Philosophy at Cornell.8 Not long
after Knight’s arrival at Cornell, his mentors determined that he was unfit to
study or teach philosophy, due to what one professor described as an “ingrained
skepticism” that would “destroy the true philosophic spirit wherever he touches
it.”9 This peculiar criticism led Knight to turn his attentions to his minor field of
economics, and he found himself a rare skeptic in a field known for its credulity
toward abstraction. His early work—as a graduate student at Cornell, a lecturer
at Chicago, and a young professor at the University of Iowa—dwelled heavily on
the ethical foundations and social effects of economic competition. By the time
he joined the faculty of the University of Chicago in 1928, he was a major figure
in the field.10 There he joined Jacob Viner, a theorist of international trade and
a former student of Frank Taussig at Harvard, to establish a leading center for
8 Donald Dewey, “Frank Knight before Cornell: Some Light on the Dark Years,” in Warren
Samuels, ed., Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, vol. 8
(Greenwich, CT, 1990), 1–38.
9 The quote is attributed to James Creighton in Alvin Johnson, Pioneer’s Progress (New York,
1952), 227.
10 Three excellent brief overviews of Knight’s work include James Buchanan, “Knight, Frank
H.,” in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York,
1968), 424–8; Scott Gordon, “Frank Knight and the Tradition of Liberalism,” Journal of
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graduate training in economics during the years before and during the Second
World War. A number of graduate students from this period recall their teachers
as having inculcated the emphasis on neoclassical price theory and distrust
for government intervention that came to define Chicago economics in later
years.
The broad influence of the economists associated with the postwar Chicago
School has generated persistent distortions in the scholarly reception of Knight’s
work, as is particularly evident in the conventional understanding of his lecture
on “The Case for Communism.” In the decades since his death in 1972, many of
Knight’s students and interpreters have deflected the lecture’s implicit indictment
of capitalism by arguing that it was deliberately ironic. “Admittedly,” the historian
of economic thought Warren Samuels wrote in a brief introduction to the essay,
“on the basis of his other writings and general ideological–philosophical position,
as well as his association with the Mont Pèlerin Society, it is difficult to interpret
Knight making the case at all seriously; it must be a joke!”11 Edward Shils, in a
reminiscence a half-century after the event, went so far as to assert that the lecture
was an “affirmation of the principles of liberalism”; and Milton Friedman’s wife
Rose, in the late 1990s, recalled it as “tongue-in-cheek.”12 In the face of apparent
discontinuities, Knight’s sharpest critiques of the capitalist order have often been
disregarded as a product of camouflaged jest.
The peculiar publication history of the talk would suggest, however, a lingering
concern that others might read it differently. After being reprinted by Knight in a
private edition, it remained unpublished, due to the objections of his students and
colleagues, until 1991. When Samuels inquired about the possibility of including
it in a research volume in 1987, Stigler indicated that “his friends have in general
opposed publication,” and a decade later Rose Friedman indicated that Knight
was said to have wished to “unpublish” the lecture.13 Knight’s private letters
do demonstrate some reservations about its distribution, but no compunction
about its content. The lecture, he wrote in 1934, “contained some things which
Political Economy 82/3 (1974), 571–7; and Robert H. Nelson, “Frank Knight and Original
Sin,” in idem, Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond (University
Park, PA, 2001), 119–38. Knight’s outstanding contemporary interpreter is Ross B. Emmett,
whose major work is his dissertation, “‘The Economist as Philosopher’: Frank H. Knight
and American Social Science during the Twenties and Early Thirties,” unpublished PhD
thesis, University of Manitoba, 1990.
11 Warren Samuels, “Introduction” to Knight, “The Case for Communism,” 50.
12 Friedman and Friedman, Two Lucky People, 37; Shils, “Some Academics, Mainly in
Chicago,” 180.
13 George Stigler to Warren Samuels, 17 March 1987, box 10, folder on “Knight,” George
Stigler Papers, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago; Friedman and Friedman, Two
Lucky People, 37.
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I think very important, but the march of political events in the world . . . has
completely changed my attitude about trying to say them even to limited circles.”14
The preceding year had brought extraordinarily rapid changes at home and
abroad: Knight was appalled by the rise of National Socialism in Germany,
and perceived the enactments of the early New Deal as further manifestations
of “a fundamental historical drift of western civilization toward bureaucratic
tyranny.”15 The volatility of the political environment was exacerbated by the
increasing prevalence of “mechanical means of communication” that enabled
the cultivation of a “technique of simultaneously creating and manipulating
the mob mind.”16 Knight worried about the capacity of his readers, in such an
environment, to appreciate the nuances of an argument that he had constructed
in deliberately incendiary terms.
In one sense, the post facto analyses of Knight’s students, colleagues, and
interpreters seem well founded: the lecture’s case for communism is severely
attenuated. Any earnest support for communism requires substantial faith in
the prospects for social reform, and Knight always considered such confidence
misplaced. He explicitly presented these qualifications in the lecture. In the
act of doing so, however, he made it quite clear that his argument was not a
“joke,” or “tongue-in-cheek,” or by any means an “affirmation of the principles
of liberalism.” It was, he acknowledged, “more of a conversion ‘from’ than a
conversion ‘to,’” inspired not by idealism but rather by the fact that the “the odor
is bad; and when the odor gets bad enough it is natural to run for air, without
being too critical as to which direction, or even how far.”17 If this lecture was not
quite a full-blown “Case for Communism,” it was quite clearly intended to serve
as the postlude of an “Ex-liberal.” As was often the case in Knight, the advocacy
was tempered, but the aspersions were real.
In referring to himself as an “Ex-liberal,” Knight drew on a term that was fast
becoming a source of contested meaning. Economists had conventionally used the
word “liberal” to designate those who were committed to free competition in both
the economic and the political spheres. The stigmatization of free markets in the
wake of the Great Depression led those who had previously identified themselves
as liberals to emphasize their departures from laissez-faire, and some scholars
adopted prefatory modifications like “neoliberalism” to differentiate their ideas.18
14 Frank Knight to Hanlo E. Batson, 2 Jan. 1934, box 58, folder 5, Frank Knight Papers,
Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.
15 Frank Knight to W. H. Kiehofer, 3 Oct. 1934, box 60, folder 23, Knight Papers.
16 Frank Knight to Hanlo E. Batson, 2 Jan. 1934, box 58, folder 5, Knight Papers.
17 Knight, “The Case for Communism,” 59–60; original emphasis.
18 Louis Rougier used the term “neoliberalism” in reference to a gathering of prominent
intellectuals committed to the revitalization of liberalism in Paris in 1938. Louis Rougier,
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The state of terminological flux was further exacerbated by the contrary, and
increasingly widespread, application of the word “liberal” to describe advocates
of progressive economic policies. At the time that he delivered “The Case
for Communism,” however, Knight did not yet see the word “liberalism” as
sufficiently problematic to demand an explanatory prefix or explicit definition.
In his lecture, and in this essay, it denotes a political order structured around a
competitive economy and a representative process of democratic adjudication.
Knight’s critique of these dual commitments of the liberal order was
extraordinarily savage in both its content and tone.19 He argued that capitalist
modes of social organization erroneously presumed that reward was primarily
determined through effort, failing to take into sufficient account the decisive roles
played by inheritance and luck.20 Competitive economies, he continued, had
demonstrated several tendencies toward irreversible degeneration as their scale
expanded: an ever-growing inequality, an expansion of monopoly through the
consolidation of business enterprises, and a widening gap between performance
and reward.21 He mocked the utilitarian philosophy that provided a theoretical
basis for free-market economics, proposing to model the “utility, or disutility, of
friends, mothers-in-law, of bridge victories and defeats, solutions of cross-word
puzzles, being stared and laughed at and snubbed.”22 Though he respected the
potential benefits of a free economy, Knight was not at all impressed by the
arguments adopted by its less nuanced defenders. This speech was a sustained
intonation of rage at both the convenient elisions of the philosophers of capitalism
and the destruction their deliberate ignorance had wrought.
Knight’s critique of democratic representation was still less restrained than his
comments on capitalism. The problem with democracy, he explained, was that it
required people to be able to express truths to one another within a framework
of rational debate. This entailed a wild overestimation of the capacities of a
democratic citizenry.23 He believed that reductive arguments often held more
rhetorical force than complex ones, and that a democratic polity would not prove
capable of distinguishing the former from the latter. Even a purely hypothetical
democracy founded on truthful discourse, Knight asserted, would surely collapse.
“Truth in society is like strychnine in the individual body,” he said, “medicinal
“Avant-Propos,” Le Colloque Walter Lippmann (Paris, 1939), 7. The term “neoliberalism”
has its own complex and contested history, and Rougier’s understanding of the term
should not be conflated with its more recent connotations.




23 Ibid., 64, 68, 73.
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in special conditions and minute doses; otherwise and in general, a deadly
poison.”24
If capitalism and democracy each demonstrated irretrievable failures as modes
of social organization, the combination of the two was uniquely problematic.25
“The dualistic social order of the 19th century liberalism,” he concluded, “made
up of economic laissez-faire and political democracy, that is, of economics and
politics alike based on competitive, mass-selling talk, is bankrupt, and it is only
a question of a successor to bid in the effects of the defunct at nominal figure.”26
Knight’s comments here have all the earnestness of unmitigated despair. He was
skeptical of capitalism, he was skeptical of democracy, and he was skeptical of any
attempt to overcome the problems of either through pragmatic social reform. “I
am personally rather inclined to the belief that to jump from competitive business
to the competitive politics of democracy,” he wrote in an iconic 1935 rebuttal of
the University of Texas economist Clarence Ayres, “is to jump from the frying
pan into the fire.” If Knight can be understood as an advocate of liberalism, he
did not find in it any kind of panacea, any prospects for longevity, or indeed any
unqualified good. “The proposal of my own formula for the easy solution of the
social problems,” he then wryly observed, “including the problem of poverty,
will have to wait for a later instalment.”27 Here, at least, he was adopting a tone
of deliberate irony.
After rejecting the notion that “The Case for Communism, from the
Standpoint of an Ex-liberal” is, in any meaningful sense, a “joke,” it might
seem necessary either to situate the speech as a dramatic and peculiar outlier
within Knight’s scholarly oeuvre as “the most orthodox of orthodox economists,”
or to determine that previous understandings of Knight as a defender of
capitalist democracy have been misconceived, and that he is instead “heterodox,”
a “radical.”28 To arrive at either of these conclusions, however, would be to
overlook the dialogic structure of Knight’s social philosophy. His positions were
paradoxical, and deliberately so. Knight perceived himself to be primarily a




27 Frank Knight, “Intellectual Confusion on Morals and Economics,” International Journal
of Ethics 45/2 (1935), 205.
28 Edwin E. Witte, “Institutional Economics as Seen by an Institutional Economist,” Southern
Economic Journal 21/2 (1954), 133, n. 4; William S. Kern, “The Heterodox Economics of
‘the Most Orthodox of Orthodox Economists’: Frank H. Knight,” American Journal of
Economics and Sociology 56/3 (1997), 319–30; Donald Patinkin, “Frank Knight as Teacher,”
in idem, Essays on and in the Chicago Tradition (Durham, NC, 1981), 36.
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than constructing his own.29 He lived, as he acknowledged in his dissertation,
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, in “a world full of contradiction and paradox,” and
his primary instinct as a scholar was to expose these qualities where he perceived
them to be elided.30 His one philosophical absolute was a refusal to indulge in the
uncritical adoption of absolutes.31 “It usually strikes me that philosophers talk
sense when they are demolishing the work of some other philosopher,” he wrote to
a colleague after his retirement as a full professor.32 His remorseless assault on the
tenets of liberalism in “The Case for Communism” should be approached in the
context of this critical instinct. For Knight, a vicious attack on the presuppositions
underlying a particular position does not necessarily indicate a preference for an
opposing position, nor does it imply that the perspective is not, given a series
of conventional alternatives, the one to which he is most sympathetic. “There is
always a principle, plausible and even sound within limits, to justify any possible
course of action and, of course, the opposite one,” he stated in his 1950 presidential
address before the American Economic Association. Like cookery, he continued,
economic theory “calls for enough and not too much, far enough and not too far,
in any direction.”33 Often, Knight found it necessary to be devastatingly critical of
the very arguments toward which he was most inclined, in an ascetic fulfillment
of his desire to deny the temptations of misplaced philosophical confidence.
His condemnation of liberalism in his 1932 speech was neither absolute nor
ironic; rather, it was an acknowledgement that liberalism, too, could fall victim
to implicit paradoxes, and manifest the tendency of all social philosophies to
disintegrate from within.
This natural inclination toward critique was exacerbated in the early 1930s
by Knight’s descent into severe depression.34 His colleagues noticed his changed
demeanor, expressed concern among themselves, and at one point assembled
a celebratory dinner in an attempt to remind him of their appreciation—an
29 Frank Knight to Jacob Viner, 9 Sept. 1925, box 16, folder 24, Viner Papers, Mudd Library,
Princeton University. Dorothy Ross emphasizes this quality in a perceptive overview
of Knight’s economic and political thought in The Origins of American Social Science
(Cambridge, 1991), 420–27.
30 Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Mineola, NY, 2006), 313.
31 When simplifications were unavoidable, he would tell his students to employ them only
through the use of a relatively absolute absolute; that is, a temporary assumption that
remained open to subsequent critique. See James Buchanan, “Born-again Economist,” in
idem, Economics from the Outside In, 78–9.
32 Frank Knight to H. B. Acton, 7 May 1955, box 58, folder 2, Knight Papers.
33 Frank Knight, “The Rôle of Principles in Economics and Politics,” 6.
34 Ross Emmett, “‘What is Truth’ in Capital Theory? Five Stories Relevant to the Evaluation
of Frank H. Knight’s Contributions to the Capital Controversy,” in John B. Davis, ed.,
New Economics and Its History (Durham, NC, 1997), 233.
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evening he later recalled, in bitter correspondence, as “the most humiliating
experience of my life.”35 He attributed his personal depression to the onset of the
Great Depression, the rise of international fascism, and the flowering of political
radicalism in the United States. “I am so depressed that it is really serious for my
work,” he wrote in 1933. “I feel that the regime of liberty has been a failure, or an
experiment with negative results, that it has shown the incapacity of large masses
of people to reach any sound conclusion by thinking and discussion.”36 Knight
felt that the liberal system had proven itself to be rotting from within. “About the
only type of government I believe in any more is a dictatorship tempered by fear
of assassination,” he declared in 1934.37 He had lost all faith in any mode of social
organization that relied upon the rationality of the masses, but could not find an
alternative that merited respect.38
Knight expressed these concerns in a 1934 letter to Friedrich Hayek, identifying
themes that would emerge as central in Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom a decade
later. “This to me is the meaning of the ‘New Deal’; it is just a detail in
the general movement of west European civilization away from liberalism to
authoritarianism.”39 The difference between Knight and Hayek lay in their
interpretation of this development and their views on what the response should
be. In The Road to Serfdom Hayek called for a final rearguard action to reverse
the course of history and construct liberalism anew. Soon after the publication
of the book he acted on this vision by founding the Mont Pèlerin Society, a
transatlantic cohort of academics, journalists, and politicians who shared the goal
of defending “absolute moral standards,” the “rule of law,” and “private property
and the competitive market” from the perceived dangers of the contemporary
world.40 Along with many of his peers in the society, Hayek juxtaposed his
lugubrious assessment of contemporary civilization with a dynamic vision of
the social possibilities available to a world that accepted his advice. To varying
degrees, these scholars cultivated the potent genre of the utopian jeremiad, which
juxtaposed a litany of the felt difficulties of the present against the possibility
35 Frank Knight to Paul Douglas, 9 Jan. 1935, box 59, folder 16, Knight Papers. Underlining
Knight’s.
36 Frank Knight to Walter Smith, 5 Oct. 1933, box 62, folder 2, Knight Papers.
37 Frank Knight to Charles Tippetts, 3 Nov. 1934, box 62, folder 11, Knight Papers.
38 Frank Knight to Carl Brinkmann, 10 Nov. 1933, box 58, folder 7, Knight Papers.
39 Frank Knight to Friedrich Hayek, 9 May 1934, box 60, folder 10, Knight Papers.
40 R. M. Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pelerin Society (Indianapolis, 1995), 41. This text,
authored by a president of the society, remains its only English-language history. The
most thorough treatment of the society is provided in Bernhard Walpen, Die Offenen
Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft: Eine Hegemonietheoretische Studie zur Mont Pèlerin Society
(Hamburg, 2004), which maintains a focus on Continental Europe and devotes limited
attention to Knight and the American membership.
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of their future dissipation. This message—the polemical core of the Reaganite
revival—achieved astonishing rhetorical success, and allowed its proponents
to cultivate a sense of messianic purpose in confronting the crises of the
time.
Knight was a member of the Mont Pèlerin Society, but he remained far less
sanguine about the possibility of developing a “new” liberalism that would be
capable of addressing the problems exposed by the social collapse of the 1930s, and
more inclined to evaluate that collapse as a manifestation of inherent paradoxes
that no careful reconstruction could overcome. His depression in the early 1930s
can be understood, in part, as the outcome of a reckoning with the implications of
his own relentless critiques. His letters from the period explain those implications
in grim detail. Invoking Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis, Knight implied
that the circumstances that made nineteenth-century civilization possible were
transient and impossible to replicate.41 Liberalism, he wrote to a former colleague
from the University of Iowa, Charles Tippetts, “was always contradictory to the
deeper currents of human nature,” a mere product of the “peculiar conditions” of
the science and geography of a particular time, and as those conditions unraveled
it grew clear that laissez-faire and democracy were “doomed.”42 Their collapse
was not due to a public turn away from liberalism or an incorrect application
of ostensibly liberal principles, but rather the final failure of the liberal idea.
As Knight occasionally reminded readers, organic complexes must eventually
“grow ‘old’ and die.”43 And despite all our delusions, nothing was more transient
than a civilization’s ideals: “dead men rise up—seldom, and dead gods, not at all.
Gods are not less mortal than men, but more so.”44 The viability of liberalism
had passed with the nineteenth century, and Knight had assumed the role of
the doubt-ridden priest of a superseded religion. He expressed his love for the
principles of liberalism alongside his belief that an enduring liberal society could
never be.
41 Frank Knight, “Social Science and the Political Trend” (1934), in idem, Freedom and Reform:
Essays in Economics and Social Philosophy (Indianapolis, 1982), 35. This essay, which was
first published in the University of Toronto Quarterly in 1934, was largely adapted from the
second half of a lecture titled “The Passing of Liberalism” which appears to have been
delivered earlier in the year. See Frank Knight, “The Passing of Liberalism,” box 17, folder
25, Knight Papers. Due to its greater accessibility, I cite “Social Science and the Political
Trend” for material that was included in both the lecture and the essay.
42 Frank Knight to Charles Tippetts, 7 July 1933, box 62, folder 10, Knight Papers. He reiterated
these thoughts months later, in Frank Knight to Edward Theiss, 9 Dec. 1933, box 62,
folder 9, Knight Papers.
43 Knight, The Dilemma of Liberalism, 58.
44 Ibid., 54. Underlining Knight’s.
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ii
Despite his substantial contributions to economic theory, Knight remains
best known for his extraordinary and peculiar qualities as a teacher at the
University of Chicago during a period in which many Nobel laureates, who
would change the profession over the course of their careers, were trained. Rose
and Milton Friedman liked to say of Knight that “two-thirds of his students never
got anything from him, and the rest never got anything out of two-thirds of
his remarks, but that the remaining one-third of one-third was well worth the
price of admission.”45 The perception of Knight’s lectures as impenetrable and
idiosyncratic, but occasionally transformative, appears to have been widespread.
Any interpretation of Knight therefore runs the risk of reducing his language
into fragments that serve as misleading proxies for the complex propositions he
sought to convey. His students and successors have tended to develop a holistic
impression of his thought from those portions of his arguments that conform
with their prior or desired beliefs. Their philosophical certitudes have at times
come at the expense of imparting a selective order to the deliberate messiness of
Knight’s world view.
In the years preceding his presentation of “The Case for Communism,” Knight
had written a series of notes to accompany his university lectures. These were
anthologized as a formal reader for students at Chicago in 1933, and this soon
became one of his most influential works. The first chapter of The Economic
Organization provides, in concert with his students’ recollections, an extensive
overview of the achievements of free markets.46 Even here, however, he refused
to extol the virtues of markets without providing continual reminders of their
limits. “It must constantly be borne in mind that explaining how the system
works does not mean justification of it, as it has a way of seeming to do,” he
wrote. Rather, one should do so primarily to identify weaknesses that ought to
be redressed.47 To Knight, the benefits of markets were generated alongside—
and often through—extraordinary harms, and he was sympathetic to critics who
found these harms unacceptable. He demonstrated little patience for those who
believed other systems of social organization could replicate capitalism’s material
abundance, and also for those who assumed that this abundance could be reaped
without sacrifices that might prove too great for society to bear.
In his descriptions of capitalism’s flaws, Knight concentrated on two problems.
His first critique was succinct but incisive: a successful capitalist society demands
inequality, and that inequality results in a social framework that is both unjust and
45 Friedman and Friedman, Two Lucky People, 38.
46 Frank Knight, The Economic Organization (New York, 1951), 31–2.
47 Ibid., 36.
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unstable.48 No adjustment or series of tweaks could solve this problem; rather, the
relationship between equality, justice, culture, and material abundance existed
under a continual tension in which increased devotion to one could threaten or
destroy the others.49 The pursuit of a single ideal, such as justice, was “impossible,
in any definition, and any serious attempt to achieve it will destroy all civilized
life,” he concluded. “It just isn’t that kind of a world.”50 Forms of inequality were
necessary both to foster the conditions for high achievement and to serve as a
motivational spur to produce and achieve; but retaining them involved injustices
that people of conscience found it difficult to endure. In a review of Hayek’s The
Road to Serfdom, he warned against the reification of any single ideal. Neither
“freedom nor truth can be treated as an absolute,” he wrote. “They conflict
with beauty and morality and other values, and with one another, necessitating
‘marginal’ comparison and compromise, and correct proportioning.”51 Society,
in a Knightian scheme, was like a multilevered scale, and the adjustment of one
weighting necessarily led to shifts in all of the others. Economic freedoms were
not something to maximize, but rather to hold in careful suspension alongside a
number of other important and often conflicting social ideals. It was a question,
he asserted in a later essay, not “of either-or but of how far, and in what ways.”52
Knight’s second critique of capitalism was more complex, and he devoted
much of his work to expounding its various dimensions and ramifications.
Many theorists of the market operated under the assumption that humankind
approached economic questions from an abstract perspective that, according
to Knight, was both emaciated and absurd. Even as rational-choice theory
flourished in the later stages of his career, he forcefully maintained that individuals
depart constantly and determinedly from rational expectations in their daily
lives. People, he observed simply in a pulpit address before the First Unitarian
48 Frank Knight, “Science, Philosophy, and Social Procedure” and “The Sickness of Liberal
Society” (1946), in idem, Freedom and Reform, 265, 453.
49 Frank Knight and Thornton W. Merriam, The Economic Order and Religion (New York,
1945), 124.
50 Frank Knight, “World Justice, Socialism, and the Intellectuals,” University of Chicago Law
Review 16/3 (1949), 441. This view strongly conflicts with the post-Rawlsian emphasis on
the primacy of justice. Nevertheless, Rawls cited Knight as an influence several times in
The Theory of Justice and owned a thoroughly annotated copy of The Ethics of Competition
(currently in the possession of David Levy). I am grateful to T. M. Scanlon for drawing
my attention to these materials.
51 Knight, “World Justice, Socialism, and the Intellectuals,” 441.
52 Frank Knight, “Conflict of Values: Freedom and Justice,” in Dudley Ward, ed., Goals of
Economic Life (New York, 1953), 230.
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Church in 1963, “do not act rationally.”53 They are creatures beset by assumptions,
habits, desires, and ideals that constantly lead them to reject choices that
abstract economic analysis would expect. “Complete rational freedom is not
only completely impossible, it is a contradiction in terms,” he wrote in a letter to
the Committee on Social Thought in 1943. “People cannot get outside their skins
or lift themselves by their bootstraps.”54 An economic system that devolves power
to individuals has extraordinary merits, but it cannot rely on the rationality of
their choices. Any such economy will reflect the always substantial limitations
and prejudices of its constituent parts.
In his early work Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Knight argued that the engine
of the competitive economy lay in its very unpredictability. In doing so he relied
on a new definition of uncertainty, identifying it as a unique kind of risk that was
not susceptible to measurement, and therefore not reducible to a quantitatively
determinate probability through the accumulation of cases into groups.55 In
a world without uncertainty intelligence would be impossible, “all organic
readjustments would become mechanical, all organisms automata,” and profit
would become unobtainable.56 People naturally strove to reduce uncertainty via
the development of superior abilities to foretell and control the future. At the
same time, however, the very uncertainty that they attempted to overcome infused
their existence with meaning: in a world of perfect knowledge, there was nothing
to discover and no contingent outcome to anticipate or imagine. Humans, in a
bleak irony, were engaged in a ceaseless quest to erode the quality that bestowed
their lives with dynamism, and rational economic activity was defined by its
attempt to overcome its necessary conditions.
Indeed, Knight argued that an enlightened society would never, and should
never, want people to act rationally from a purely economic perspective. He
remorselessly assailed economists’ tendency to approach economic rationality
as a meritorious framework of behavior. The “rational, economic, criticism of
values gives results repugnant to all common sense,” Knight observed in his 1922
essay on “Ethics and the Economic Interpretation,” and the “economic man is
the selfish, ruthless object of moral condemnation.”57 Capitalism as a framework
of organization operated through a matrix of assumed behaviors that, when
53 Frank Knight, “Christian Ethics and Social Betterment” (pulpit address, First Unitarian
Church, Chicago, expanded version), 18 Aug. 1963, 19, box 4, folder 6, Knight Papers.
54 Frank Knight to the Committee on Social Thought and Dean Katz, 7 Dec. 1943, box 59,
Knight Papers.
55 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 48, 231–2.
56 Ibid., 268.
57 Knight, “Ethics and the Economic Interpretation” (1922), in idem, The Ethics of Competition
(New Brunswick, 1997), 30.
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unmitigated, conflicted with all decent standards of morality. It was a social
system without a viable social ideal, and as such could only function due to the
countervailing irrationalities its theorists, strangely, continued to condemn.
Instead, human action departed continually and decisively from the
predictions of the abstract datum of the economic theorist, and economic
activity as such was not pursued primarily for financial or material gains. We
could see this, Knight emphasized, in the often abstemious personal lives of
those individuals who were most successful in pecuniary terms.58 The appetite
for prosperity was a desire not so much for the ability to purchase more and
better consumer goods, but rather to achieve success at the most extraordinary of
competitive endeavors. Powerful businessmen, he wrote in Risk, Uncertainty, and
Profit, “consume in order to produce rather than produce in order to consume, in
so far as they do either. The real motive is the desire to excel, to win at a game, the
biggest and most fascinating game yet invented, not excepting even statecraft and
war.”59 The tragedy of this particular game, of course, was that partaking in it was
not optional, and it tended to tyrannize the different games that might otherwise
be played. Knight sounded this mournful note in a passage in “The Ethics of
Competition”: “In a social order where all values are reduced to the money
measure in the degree that this is true of modern industrial nations, a considerable
fraction of the most noble and sensitive characters will lead unhappy and even
futile lives.”60 He expressed consistent discomfort with the term “capitalism,” and
the reasons are evident here. First, Knight did not believe that economic activity
revolved around capital, so much as the symbolic validation that capital implied
within the broader rules and patterns of the game. Second, he was unwilling to
accept those parameters as a greater or lesser source of value than those of the
innumerable other games one might find it worthwhile to play. The very adoption
of the term “capitalism” could be construed as an indication of the ways in which
the liberal worldview had, with the passage of time, gone awry.
Even to the extent that individuals did attempt to achieve their individual
wants through rational activity, Knight remained skeptical of the wisdom
of the capitalist system. He wrestled in particular with the critique that
advertising manipulates these wants to encompass items that have little or even
negative intrinsic value. Without arriving at any final conclusions, he repeatedly
acknowledged the seriousness of this problem. “[O]ne of the most fundamental
weaknesses of the market system is the use of persuasive influence by sellers upon
buyers,” he wrote in 1934, “and a general excessive tendency to produce wants for
58 Knight, “The Ethics of Competition” (1923), in idem, The Ethics of Competition, 51.
59 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, 360.
60 Knight, “The Ethics of Competition,” 58.
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goods rather than goods for the satisfaction of wants.”61 Here Knight borrowed
some insights from institutionalism, a leading contemporary approach to the
study of economics. Institutional economics—associated most prominently with
John R. Commons of Wisconsin, Wesley Mitchell of Columbia, and Thorstein
Veblen—prioritized empirical research over theoretical analysis, and emphasized
the importance of cultural norms and habits in forming economic behavior.62
Knight was often referenced as a leading opponent of institutionalism, but he
acknowledged that its adherents were in possession of a partial truth.63 His
approach to the profession’s methodological disputes was one of provocative
triangulation: “It is not either this or that or the other,” he wrote in an essay
on institutionalism in 1952, “but all of them, each in its proper place and
proportion—like economic choices themselves.”64 Like many institutionalists,
Knight believed that consumers were not able to evaluate the information
provided by advertisements with dispassionate objectivity. Rather, they were
constantly vulnerable to the manufacture of wants, many of which did not
redound to the social good.
In their refusal to behave as rational, atomistic units in ceaseless pursuit of an
increased ability to purchase consumption goods, Knight believed that humans
continually obstructed the economic theorist’s utopia of perfect competition.
And in a final swipe at the conceptual foundations of capitalism, he asserted that
the achievement of this utopia would itself be catastrophic. “Perfect competition
implies conditions,” he reminded readers in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit,
“especially as to the presence of human limitations, which would at the same time
facilitate monopoly, make organization through free contract impossible, and
force an authoritarian system upon society.”65 Without competent intervention
and remedial action, Knight believed that free-enterprise economies would enter
into cataclysmic cycles of expansion and contraction. Unconstrained by legal and
moral restraints, they would produce intolerable, and ultimately unsustainable,
degrees of inequality and injustice. Competition, he believed, was only preserved
by its departures from perfection.66
61 Knight, “Social Science and the Political Trend,” 39.
62 Yuval P. Yonay, The Struggle over the Soul of Economics: Institutionalist and Neoclassical
Economists in America between the Wars (Princeton, NJ, 1998), 50–52.
63 Ibid., 144.
64 Knight, “Institutionalism and Empiricism in Economics,” American Economic Review
42/2 (1952), 45–55, 46. Knight’s institutionalist sympathies strengthened later in his life, as
evidenced in Knight to Clarence Ayres, 13 July 1969, box 58, folder 4, Knight Papers.
65 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 193. Knight reiterated this opinion decades later in his
presidential address before the American Economic Association. See Knight, “The Rôle
of Principles in Economics and Politics,” 19.
66 Knight and Merriam, The Economic Order and Religion, 105–6.
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After sorting through the litany of Knight’s critiques of capitalism—its
fostering of inequality, its vulnerability to unsavory manipulations, its implicit
idealization of an emaciated “economic man” and an unworkable “perfect
competition”—the temptation arises to situate Knight among the institutionalists
and economic radicals for whom he at times felt an explicit affinity. To do so,
however, is to misunderstand his propensity to criticize even those ideals he found
most appealing, and to overlook his deeply conservative inclination to place bets,
in the face of paralyzing uncertainty, on the side of established practice. Less
than a year after presenting his speech on “The Case for Communism,” Knight
described this instinct in a letter to Walter Smith, an economist at William College:
Trying to look as deep as possible into fundamentals, I feel that both the radicals and
conservatives are right. On the one hand, the old system had got to where its workings
could not be tolerated, and there is absolutely no use in thinking of going back to it. On
the other hand, it just doesn’t seem real to me that any convention of the best minds could
do much in the way of designing a new system to order . . . 67
Knight was living in a world of desperately bad alternatives, which allowed him
to advocate the market system despite a severe distaste for its myriad effects and a
conviction that it was piloting itself toward an inevitable and disastrous collapse.
Despite their particular differences, Knight shared with Hayek a deep respect for
frameworks of social interaction that had demonstrated functional successes and
a suspicion of the potentially disastrous implications of radical social reform.
“I’m very curious as to what alternative to the profit-system you can think of that
wouldn’t be worse,” he wrote to a colleague in 1957. “I’ve been trying to think of
one for a half-century or so, without success.”68 He demonstrated the radical’s
capacity to lament the inadequacies of the present world and to yearn for a better
one, but he lacked the ability to believe that the necessary options existed or that
the desired changes might come to be. His was a critique divorced, deliberately
but with a sense of tragedy, from action.
Knight’s advocacy of the market economy was always restrained. He levied
constant and explicit critiques of a capitalist social framework, and remained
very clear that he did not support any economic policy resembling laissez-faire.69
What fluctuated over the course of his academic career was not his analysis of
capitalism’s benefits and defects—which remained remarkably consistent, despite
(and, in part, due to) his deliberately self-subversive tone—but rather his belief
in the sustainability of the status quo. The economic and political events of the
67 Frank Knight to Walter Smith, 29 Nov. 1933, box 62, folder 2, Knight Papers.
68 Frank Knight to Herbert Joseph Muller, 6 Nov. 1957, box 61, folder 8, Knight Papers.
69 Frank Knight, “Laissez-Faire: Pro and Con” (1967), in idem, Selected Essays by Frank H.
Knight, ed. Ross Emmett, vol. 2 (Chicago, 1999), 439.
530 angus burgin
early 1930s thrust him into a state of crisis, and he temporarily abandoned all faith
in the stability of the social system. His letters in this period repeated a belief that
all economic and political freedoms would be lost within ten or twenty years.70
In such an environment the assumed stability of the status quo and instability of
radical change were thrown into flux. “The Case for Communism” is the product
of a moment when Knight believed his suspicion of radicalism might no longer
hold, and as a result considered the possibility of alternative structures of social
organization. The grimness with which he did so reminds his readers that he was
not, in any substantive sense, a radical. The fact that he did so at all reminds them
that this was a time when the assumptions of liberalism seemed, even to their
most prominent defenders, to have passed away.
iii
Knight approached a market-based economy and a democratic government
as the two constitutive elements of the liberal philosophy.71 In his analysis
of democracy, he adopted the same three-part explanatory structure that he
employed in his writings on capitalism: examining first its substantial virtues;
second, its inextricable failures; and third, the reasons to uphold it in spite of
those flaws. He exalted the democratic commitment to free discussion, indicating
that without that basic freedom there was little reason to exist. But the viability
of such a system depended on the capacity of a citizenry to develop decision-
making procedures that would enable them to arrive at an informed consensus.72
These procedures invariably failed, leading democratic societies to descend into
polemic and controversy.73 This, to him, was the core of the human predicament:
a need for freedom combined with an incapacity to sustain it. In a Knightian
world, societies were continually engaged in the act of destroying the very quality
that made their existence worthwhile.
The root of the problem was rhetoric, a preoccupation that began to permeate
his essays in the early 1930s and remained a central theme for the duration of
his career. He presented his detailed position in a preface to the 1933 reissue of
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit: “discussion must be contrasted with persuasion,
with any attempt to influence directly the acts, or beliefs, or sentiments, of
others,” he wrote. The latter “is the basic error, or heresy, of modern civilization,
70 Frank Knight to H. T. Warshow, 9 May 1934, box 58, folder 2, Knight Papers; and Frank
Knight to Oskar Morgenstern, 26 July 1934, box 61, folder 8, Knight Papers.
71 Knight, “The Case for Communism,” 85.
72 Frank Knight, “The Passing of Liberalism,” 11; Knight, “World Justice, Socialism, and the
Intellectuals,” 437.
73 Knight and Merriam, The Economic Order and Religion, 63.
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and represents a kind of original sin.”74 He was still more forthright in a
footnote he added to “Economic Theory and Nationalism” two years later: “the
very concept of discussion excludes all use of force, including persuasion, in
any form.”75 Knight perceived persuasion as a mode of coercion, which—like
physical repression—operated to prevent the open progress of dialogue. “Truth
is established only by discussion, in the absence of coercion” he wrote in 1941,
adding that coercion includes “‘persuasion,’ in the distinctive and proper meaning
of that term, the core of which is deception.”76 A political order based on the
free interchange of ideas and opinions would only be possible in a discursive
environment expunged of persuasive rhetoric.
Knight failed, however, to provide any clear explanation of how a language
devoid of persuasion would function. Any speech delivered with intent, in which
the intent affects either the words chosen or the structure of the phrase, holds
some rhetorical dimension. The starkness of Knight’s pessimism derives from the
fact that his quarrel lay with the structure of language itself: a discomfort with
the intentional elisions that are entailed in the process of expressing thought and
experience in discernible signs. Much that goes wrong, according to Knight, is
attributable to the need to reduce a complex world into much simpler sentences.77
His own relentlessly paradoxical prose reflected a desire to draw constant attention
to these elisions, and—by refracting constantly on and through itself—to point
toward truths that resisted linguistic reduction. Failing to expunge rhetoric from
his own language, he maintained a style of prose at relentless war with itself.
His texts, like battlefields, generated spectacular effects with results that were
invariably grim.
Given the severity of his interpretation of rhetorical excess, it can be no surprise
that Knight found democratic governments to fall far short of the ideal. Free
citizenries demonstrated little capacity to distinguish truth from fabrication, and
as a result tended to hold the beliefs they felt to be least troubling or most pleasant:
a characteristic skilled rhetoricians found it easy to exploit. Mass populations,
Knight stated in his speech on “The Passing of Liberalism,” “never showed
any capacity for intelligent analysis of political issues or for agreeing on any
possible, workable solution of public problems.”78 Instead, they filtered difficult
74 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, xxxv–xxxvi.
75 Knight, “Economic Theory and Nationalism,” in idem, The Ethics of Competition, 348 n.
76 Knight, “The Meaning of Democracy: Its Politico-economic Structure and Ideals” (1941),
in idem, Freedom and Reform, 227. Original emphasis.
77 Knight cited the law as an example of this phenomenon, asserting that it “is an ass” in part
because it “must be stated in sentences.” See Knight, “The Rôle of Principles in Economics
and Politics,” 6.
78 Knight, “The Passing of Liberalism,” 18.
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political questions through a gauzy anti-intellectualism that made thoughtful
analysis impossible.79 Liberalism failed due to its very premises, as citizens proved
incapable of handling the freedom of discussion and self-determination.80 “The
mystery is not that representative institutions were discredited,” he concluded in
that speech, “but that any other result could have been expected.”81
Knight’s lack of faith in dialogue led him to believe that an open framework
for discussion rewarded bad ideas and neglected meritorious ones. In two letters
written in the winter of 1933–4, he drew explicit parallels between his analysis
of rhetoric in academic debate and advertising in free markets. In both cases,
Knight’s conviction that people were generally irrational, manipulable, or rooted
in established conventions led him to believe that structures of free interchange
benefited rhetoricians over honest participants. Knight wrote in a November
letter to Walter Smith that he had always recognized sweeping limitations in the
principle of laissez-faire, but had arrived at the conclusion that in the field of
intellectual leadership it was “inherently and overwhelmingly bad.”82 He already
held a grim view of the ability of individuals to make rational choices when
confronted with a consumer good or a politician. In the more ephemeral realm
of ideas and ideals, he found the record of the invisible hand to be “necessarily
disastrous.” The use of persuasion and salesmanship in intellectual life, he told
an assistant lecturer in his department, is “in a way much worse than what
we see in business and politics where ‘God knows’ the results have been bad
enough!”83 In the broad pantheon of sinister manipulations, Knight’s distrust
of the businessperson was exceeded only by his distrust of the politician and
the public intellectual.84 When called upon to justify capitalism, he would
pay it a backhanded complement: the predatory manipulations of purveyors
of goods tended to be less severe and disastrous than those of politicians or
visionary intellectuals.85 In his world, people could be counted on to make poor
decisions about their products and their candidates, and still worse decisions
about their ideas. Knight was a committed advocate for freedom of thought
and expression, but he remained convinced that a society constructed around
those ideals necessarily collapsed from within. He approached the problems of
79 Ibid., 11.
80 See, for example, Frank Knight, “Pragmatism and Social Action” (1936), in idem, Freedom
and Reform, 50.
81 Knight, “Social Science and the Political Trend,” 36.
82 Frank Knight to Walter Smith, 29 Nov. 1933, box 62, folder 2, Knight Papers.
83 Frank Knight to Hanlo E. Batson, 2 Jan. 1934, box 58, folder 5, Knight Papers.
84 Journalists who care about truth, Knight wrote, “will simply be eliminated by the process
of natural selection, through market demand.” See Knight, “World Justice, Socialism, and
the Intellectuals,” 436.
85 See Frank Knight to Hanlo E. Batson, 2 Jan. 1934, box 58, folder 5, Knight Papers.
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the resulting political world with the hopelessness of the atheist who believes in
original sin.
Knight’s conviction that humans were incapable of engaging in an intelligent
and sustained process of democratic adjudication led him to reject socialism
as a viable solution to the suffering produced by capitalist societies. It was a
mistake, he argued, to perceive inequality primarily in terms of material goods.
Humans were much more concerned with the allotment of “dignity, prestige,
and power,” and a society in which these qualities were allocated through a
flawed political process was vulnerable to still greater manipulation, dispersion,
and discontent than one in which they were allocated primarily through the
distribution of capital.86 This severe critique of democratic socialism led Knight
to position himself in opposition to many of his more progressive peers, and
to develop a reputation as a leading opponent of government intervention. He
demonstrated little patience for ambitious attempts at social reform, instilled
many of his students with a corrosive distrust of politics, and played an active
role in the network of scholars surrounding the Mont Pèlerin Society in its early
years.
Knight’s suspicions of the merits of public discussion, however, also point
toward meaningful differences between him and his colleagues and successors.87
His views formed a particularly clear contrast with the positions outlined in
The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) by Karl Popper, a close colleague of
Hayek’s who played a central role in the Mont Pèlerin Society’s initial meeting.
There, Popper forcefully advocated a society built upon a “critical rationalism”
that resolved differences through open structures of debate.88 These proposals
represented a limited political extension of Popper’s earlier claims in The Logic of
Scientific Discovery (1934) that science progressed through an open competition
of hypotheses in which the losers suffered eventual falsification at the hands of the
facts.89 Political debate was, of course, complicated by the differing constitution
(and debatable existence) of the “facts” and the corresponding contestations over
what could be considered “falsification,” but Popper shared in both cases a faith in
the ability of communities of rational individuals to arrive, through collaboration
and consensus, at correct and justifiable conclusions with the passage of time.
86 Frank Knight, “Economic Theory and Nationalism,” 301.
87 On the divide separating Knight from his peers and successors see Robert Van Horn
and Philip Mirowski, “The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of
Neoliberalism,” in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., The Road from Mont Pèlerin:
The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge, MA, 2009).
88 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ, 1971), 237. On
Popper’s critical rationalism see Malachi Hacohen, Karl Popper: The Formative Years,
1902–1945, Politics and Philosophy in Interwar Vienna (Cambridge, 2000).
89 See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 2002).
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Popper’s ideas had a formative influence on Milton Friedman as the latter
developed his foundational essay on “The Methodology of Positive Economics.”90
Friedman envisioned economics as a social science that would function much
as Popper described natural science: economists would develop hypotheses, and
the “winning” hypotheses would be identified by tests to determine empirical
validity.91 Also like Popper, Friedman drew upon his scientific methodology in
his approach to public discussion. Later in his career he became—despite his
academic achievements—best known for his activities as a popular polemicist,
and he remained consistently willing to set forth his arguments in the public
battleground of ideas. Friedman embraced the role of public intellectual, and
expressed continued optimism about a democratic society’s ability to arbitrate
differing truth-claims and eventually arrive at a reasoned conclusion.92 Chicago
economics came to be defined by these qualities: faith in the manifest rationality
of consumers, the wisdom of crowds, and the success of well-grounded truth-
claims in the marketplace of ideas.
Popper’s and Friedman’s approaches to these questions wholly invert
the Knightian analysis of politico-academic discussion, demonstrating a
fundamental division within the broader milieu of the Mont Pèlerin Society. This
variance precipitated divergent approaches to the role of the academic intellectual
in public debate, which in turn inspired widely differing views of what the
purpose of such a society should be. The use of the scientific method in the study
of society, Knight had warned, was a “romantic folly,” which failed to account
for the pivotal distinctions between human subjects and subjects in the natural
world, and therefore implicitly validated the cultural assumptions reflected in the
questions social scientists asked and the behaviors their subjects manifested.93
While Knight disavowed all rhetoric and argued that persuasion engendered many
of the foundational problems of modern life, Friedman embraced persuasive
argument as a necessary element of social discussion. While Knight remained
90 Friedman and Friedman, Two Lucky People, 215.
91 Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in idem, Essays in Positive
Economics (Chicago, 1953), 3–43.
92 An openly polemical tone, and sustained optimism about the eventual outcome of public
debate, are evident in Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, 1982); and
Milton Friedman and Rose D. Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New York,
1981).
93 Frank Knight, “The Rôle of Principles in Economics and Politics,” 11. Edward Purcell
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struggles to develop a viable alternative, in The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific
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convinced throughout his life that society was spiraling downward as its internal
contradictions approached a tragic denouement, Friedman manifested strong
faith in the eventual possibility of a positive social outcome. And while Knight
castigated his peers for their forays out of academe in the belief that scholars
should fiercely guard and work to justify their mantle of disinterested objectivity,
Friedman asserted that the academic intellectual had both an opportunity and
a responsibility to play an active role in fomenting positive social change.94
Knight remained a model of the alienated, eremitic critic; Friedman helped
to establish the late twentieth-century genre of the public policy intellectual.
The waning of Knight’s influence with the passage of time, and the increasing
centrality of Friedman within both the Mont Pèlerin Society and the Department
of Economics at Chicago, explain much about the transformation in these
institutions’ public profiles in the decades following the Second World War. From
their distinctive self-presentations to their highly defined views, they provide
loose personifications of the defeated and disconsolate liberalism of the 1930s and
its resurgence in the postwar era. Reencountering Knight provides a reminder of
the significance of the divide that lies between the two. As Knight’s student and
Friedman’s contemporary Paul Samuelson observed, “if Doctor Friedman is one
of those optimists who thinks that capitalism is the best of all possible worlds, Dr.
Knight was one of those pessimists who is afraid that this is indeed the case.”95
iv
Knight’s refractory expository style makes him a barometer of accepted
political and economic assumptions. In the 1930s, he was counted among a
limited cadre of academic intellectuals devoted to the reversal of the New Deal
and the restoration of certain liberal ideals. Today, his essays can appear to have
more in common with radical critiques of economic and political individualism.
The reality, as he freely admitted, lay somewhere between—or inclusive of—the
two. “Truth,” for Knight, was always a difficult concept, and one susceptible
to interpretive oversimplifications. His philosophical perspective remained, to
paraphrase “The Case for Communism,” in a state of moving from rather than
progressing to. His less careful readers have demonstrated a tendency, to the extent
that his ideas were critical of the accepted standards, to disregard his unmoored
state and to assume that he had anchored at an oppositional view.
To more recent readers who might identify a leftist valence in Knight’s
dialectical critiques, it is important to remember the perspectives that drew
him together with the loosely affiliated group of academic advocates of the
94 Frank Knight to Abram L. Harris, 7 July 1934, box 60, folder 5, Knight Papers.
95 Paul Samuelson, “Frank Knight, 1885–1972,” Newsweek, 31 July 1972, 55.
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free market in the 1930s.96 This community did not yet have the stridency it
exhibited in the postwar years: Lionel Robbins and Friedrich Hayek, for instance,
shared many of Knight’s reservations about laissez-faire and his belief that any
functional new liberalism would need to overcome the accepted failures of the
old. Knight joined them in expressing continuous and unreserved enmity for the
New Deal, and pessimism about earnest attempts to generate social change.97
Despite his distaste for political parties, many surviving letters reveal Knight’s
support for Republican candidates, and none align him with specific alternatives.
His antiauthoritarianism inspired generations of colleagues and students—from
Henry Simons and James Buchanan to Milton Friedman and George Stigler—to
distrust the hand of government wherever it might be found.98 His scholarly
sympathy with the call for radical change was never joined with the confidence
to pursue it.
At the same time, those who align Knight too closely with his colleagues
and students in the Mont Pèlerin Society must remember his skepticism of all
political absolutes and his clearly voiced aversion to many of their ideas. Unlike his
contemporaries at the London School of Economics and his successors at Chicago,
Knight never accepted the alchemy of spontaneous order. In open markets, he
remained anxious over rising inequalities and pernicious manipulations; in open
societies, he worried about the debilitating effects of rhetorical debate; and in
a culture committed to both, he remained convinced that an excess of liberal
freedoms would collapse upon itself. He explained some of his criticisms in a
University of Chicago Press internal review of The Road to Serfdom, in which he
complained that Hayek’s work remains “essentially negative,” “hardly considers
the problem of alternatives,” and “inadequately recognizes the necessity, as well
as political inevitability, of a wide range of governmental activity in relation to
economic life in the future,” instead dealing “only with the simpler fallacies.”99
Knight was a liberal who believed that the liberal project had, due to its own
shortcomings, failed, and he had little sympathy for those whom he perceived
to wish to restore the former ideal.100 By the late 1950s, he was convinced that
advocates of free markets had grown “doctrinaire,” and privately denounced
96 Paul Samuelson commented on Knight’s antipathy toward planned economies in a
reminiscence following his death, but then went so far as to compare him to Herbert
Marcuse, enigmatically referring to members of the New Left as “Knight without the
market.” Samuelson, “Frank Knight, 1885–1972,” 55.
97 See, for example, Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 375; and idem, “The Breakdown of
Liberalism” (1950), 3, box 1 (figure one), folder 11 (figure eleven), Knight Papers.
98 On Knight’s antiauthoritarianism see Stigler, Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist, 18.
99 Frank Knight to general editor and Committee on Publication, University of Chicago
Press, 10 Dec. 1943, box 40, folder 17, Knight Papers.
100 Knight, “The Rôle of Principles in Economics and Politics,” 21.
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Friedman’s increasingly aggressive proposals—including the abolition of public
schools—as “foolish.”101 The defenders of liberalism played a necessary role, he
argued, but they defeated their own purpose by propounding “oversimplified”
and “extremist propaganda” that ignored the failures of nineteenth-century
liberalism and the social changes of the subsequent decades.102 He remained
sympathetic to the institutionalist critique of capitalism, and late in his career
indicated that he might agree as much with Galbraith as with his own ostensible
successors. “Colleagues spoof at [Galbraith], but I find some truth in what he
says, perhaps as much as in their position—e.g. Milton Friedman,” he wrote to
Lionel Robbins and his family. “Half-truth,” he then added, might be “a lot”
in contemporary economics.103 The advocates of capitalism had much of value
to convey, Knight believed, but they were disastrously unwilling to acknowledge
its manifest flaws. In contrast to his peers, his was a conservatism borne not of
conviction but rather of despair.
Knight will always remain an oddity, difficult to situate and resistant to the
limitations of any narrative historians attempt to impose. His scholarly career
unfolded in reluctant and self-conscious—but nevertheless sustained—violation
of his own dictum, expressed in a presidential speech before the American
Economic Association, that “there is no transgression more unforgivable than
refusing to be ‘optimistic’ and ‘constructive.’”104 Demonstrating a characteristic
unusual among academics, he reserved his strongest and most persistent language
to acts of self-abnegation: he was an economist who began his textbook on
economics with “a warning against attaching too much importance to it,” a social
theorist who denied the final legitimacy of any single social theory, and a prolific
author who wrote several years before his death, “my wish is to be forgotten—not
that I probably need worry! No form of ‘survival’ makes any sense to me, and
the less said the better.”105 He was a specialist who emphasized the constricted
boundaries of his profession, a philosopher who declared the impotence of truths,
a liberal appalled by the effects of laissez-faire, and a democrat who pronounced
his peers incapable of governing themselves. His readers find constancy on the
bedrock of paradox.
Nevertheless Knight remained intensely affected, and at times distressed, by
his avocation as a critic. He wrote to a colleague in 1939 that his “neutrality
101 Frank Knight to W. H. Rappard, 3 Nov. 1957, box 28, folder 55, Nachlass William E.
Rappard, Bundesarchiv, Berne, Switzerland.
102 Frank Knight, “Abstract Economics as Absolute Ethics,” Ethics 76/3 (1966), 162–77, 163.
103 Frank Knight to the Robbins family, 18 Feb. 1968, box 61, folder 18, Knight Papers.
104 Knight, “The Rôle of Principles in Economics and Politics,” 5.
105 Knight, The Economic Organization, 3; Frank Knight to the Robbins family, 18 Feb. 1968,
box 61, folder 18, Knight Papers.
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means being treated as an enemy by both sides, or escaping this fate only by
being regarded as utterly insignificant, or being actually unheard of.”106 He
was an unreserved cynic, but this was not a wholly exaggerated account of his
scholarly fate. While more politically engaged colleagues and students endure
the ongoing glare of analytic floodlights, his own writings remain in the more
rarely illuminated byways of the history of economic thought. And associates
of all political persuasions expressed a persistent wariness of his views, even at
the momentary points where they appeared, possibly, to agree. “Knight means
well,” one student activist said when departing his lecture on “The Case for
Communism,” “but I am afraid we will have to shoot him along with the rest.”107
Frank Knight did not live in a world sympathetic to those who eschewed certainty
and embraced contradiction; but despite the occasional note of mourning, he
encountered the trials of his adversarial position with mustered resolution, and
found some dignity in the dubious role. The expectation of improved conditions,
he slyly maintained, was the most certain sign that they would not come to be.
106 Frank Knight to Dr R. H. Tawney, 28 April 1939, box 62, folder 9, Knight Papers.
107 In Two Lucky People, 37, Rose Friedman claimed to have overheard these words as she
departed the lecture hall. In an earlier letter, Milton Friedman indicated that “someone
walking out of the auditorium” had “supposedly” overheard a similar comment. Milton
Friedman to Ralf Dahrendorf, 11 Sept. 1975, box 25, folder 2, Milton Friedman Papers.
